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The Betnrns to Investment in Higher Levels of Education in Kenya 
At independence, Kami stated that it intended to achieve 
universal free primary education^ In 1967 only those types of 
education above form 4 were free.2 The reason for the absence 
of free education at the lower levels is simple: the Government 
can not afford it.* The reason for the free education at the 
higher levels is, I would maintain, also simple: it has tradi-
tionally been so for those sorts of education (except for forms 
5 and 6; which have a Cambridge Certificate (graduation from 
fo;rm 4) as a prerequisite. This policy is usually justified on the basis of manpower needs combined with students being unable 
to afford expensive higher education,^ It is true that few 
students (or their families) would have the ability to pay out 
the full cost of these higher levels of education as the costs 
are incurred (the recurrent cost of a year at the University 
College Nairobi for one student is £1050, which is some 28 times 
the average per capita income of £38). This does not imply how-
ever that they would be unable, over a number of years, to pay 
for such education. The objectives of this paper are to determine 
the return that is currently being earned on educational invest-
ment and to determine the return which vrould be earned if the 
individual had to pay back the cost of the education via a loan 
programme, so that it can be ascertained whether such a programme 
is economically feasible. 
Lifetime Earnings 
Ideally, in a study of the economic returns to education, 
one would like to have the earnings history of retired people 
having identical backgrounds and abilities but differing amounts 
of education. In addition, It would be desirable to have a 
purely competitive economj^  so that earnings reflected marginal 
products. Unfortunately such data are not available for any 
country in the world.5 Since this study only investigates the 
private returns to education, and is hence concerned with 
actual earnings rather than marginal products, the assumption 
of competitiveness is not required. Because of the short time 
that high level education has been at all widespread, data 
for any study of returns to higher levels of education in Kenya 
will be far from the ideal. Using a number of explicit assump-
tions, this study will comjmte the private rate 'of return to 
various amounts of education. The sensitivity of the data to 
many of these assumptions will be demonstrated 'by introducing 
marginal changes in the examples and comparing results. 
To find a rate of return, one needs to know the earnings 
histories of persons with and without a specific increment in 
education and the costs of that increment. Here, only levels 
of education above Form 4 are considered.6 Earnings are calcu-
lated, in all cases, from government scales for civil servants 
and teachers.7 
By assuming a standard income by education level, all of 
the problems associated with personal differences between 
individuals are cut away. Thus, if actual earnings for each 
person in a cohort were found, in addition to the differences In 
earnings due to education, one would also need to account for 
the effect of differences in'ability, race, social class, and 
many other variables. 
For many reasons, earnings of those in the private sector 
are not considered. First, it would certainly not be easy, and 
probably not be possible, to determine wage or salary levels by 
education in the private sector. Trying to estimate how these 
salaries would increase with the age of the employee would be 
even more difficult. Also, there may be more variation to 
private than public sector earnings for effectively the same 
job, due to the large number of employers in the private sec^or 
,..«•/2 
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as opposed to the smaller number in the public sector. As a 
justification for this procedure, it should be noted that the 
public' sector employment did amount to one third of total 
reported employment in 1966 and about 40% of the high level 
manpower in the country and many feel that the earnings levels 
in the public sector tend to set the trend for private sector 
earnings.® 
Eight categories of earnings and education are considered 
4 = 4th form education and 4th form requirement for a job; 
4 + = 4th form education plus a government training program 
of nine months; 
6 = 6th form education; 
PI = 4th form plus two years -of teacher training college— 
primary school teaching; 
SLA = 6th form plus one year teacher training college— 
.secondary school teaching; 
SLB = 4th form plus three years teacher'training college— 
secondary school teaching; 
A .. = Education through university graduation—earnings on 
A scale (either civil service or leaching); 
A+ = Education through university graduation—earnings on 
A scale followed by Super Scale; 
The A scaled (starting' salary £804) is used for univer-
sity graduates and the minimum increment, in salary each year 
until the top salary is reached has' been assumed. Here the 
way is split into two streams: either the man or woman stays 
at that salary for the rest of his career (this I call the A 
Scale) or he graduates, it is assumed, to the Super Scale 
(beginning at £2175) and moves up one salary level per year to 
the top (this I call the A plus Super Scale or just A+). In 
fact, to date, people tend to move up more quickly.than this 
suggests. Balancing against this latter fact are two 
considerations. First, this rapid promotion can not remain 
the average behavior as more and more graduates leave the 
universities and as Africanization is completed. Secondly, 
only a small proportion of the university graduates will make 
the Super Scale levels in the long run. Both scales are 
presented so that the reader can see the sensitivity to the 
de facto assumptions' associated with each and get an idea of 
the effect on the rate of return of his own evaluation as to 
the correct average speed of promotion. 
G9 is the level at which both 6th and. 4th form graduates 
come into government, but the latter come in at a lower part 
of it (£268 as opposed to £548). A fourth form graduate may 
be taken into a training programme, however, of nine months 
duration (I call this 4+). After his training such a person 
would enter at a G? level C£520). Finally, I consider PI 
(starting at £J48) and SI (starting at.£582),whose lifetime 
earnings are completely and unambiguously specified by the 
Government. 
These then, are the salary scales. It is still necessary 
to make assumptions about the number of years in; the work force. 
Starting with the end of form 4 as year zero, (approximately 
18 years of age) persons with each amount of education enter 
the work force a number of years later, the specific number 
depending on the education necessary for the scale. Each 
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person is assumed to stay in the work force until age 55 
(year 37), the age suggested'by Government for retirement. 
To test the sensitivity-of this assumption, I also calculate 
the effect of staying "an extra three years in the work for.cc. 
Since I am concerned -with private returns, earnings 
after tax are used. Increments in earnings which are taxed 
away are of no merit to the individual. In addition, housing 
subsidies are included as part of earnings, as these are part 
of the job "package" for which education qualifies people. 
Thus, the thing., that is, called "Earnings" throughout. this 
paper is actually salary +housing subsidy - taxes.12 The 
pension is another aspect of the earnings package which has 
an effect on real income, but it was felt that it is too com-
plex for inclusion in this analysis. Because pensions change 
as salary changes and they are not realized until retirement, 
the assumptions necessary to attribute a portion of the value 
to a specific year would have to be quite arbitrary and would 
determine completely the effect of their inclusion. 
Finally it is assumed that there will be no unemploy-
ment at the levels of education which are being considered 
here. Assuming that any unemployment would appear first among the 
TABLE 1: Income + Subsidy - Tax: Lifetime 
(Kenyan £' s) 
4 4 + 6 PI SI A, B A A+ 
To age 55a 25,126 46,423 25,119 28,504 39,955 52,377 6t,7l8 
To age 58b 27,454 53,420 27,447 31,216 44,116 58,267 71,428 
aGovernment1s suggested retirement age. 
^Porty years after form 4. 
Sources: See text. 
least educated, unemployment would increase the average incre-
ment in earnings of the most highly educated. Therefore, these 
are probably low estimates of the earnings differential associa-
ted with increments in education. (see Table 1 for estimate of 
lifetime earnings.) 
Costs of Education 
So much for earnings. Now, costs will be considered. 
Educational costs are of two types. Pirst there are the direct 
costs: teachers' salaries, books, stationery, electricity, etc. 
Second, and sometimes neglected, are the costs of the earnings 
which are foregone by the students.who are in school rather than 
in the labor force earning a wageTaking this latter factor 
first, when earnings increments are considered, as described 
above, foregone earnings have already been taken into account. 
That is, the earnings of the individual with the lesser amount 
o.f education during the years the other man continues his educa-
tion are, one can assume, the earnings which the person who 
continues his education is foregoing.1* Thus, part of the 
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difference between the earnings streams of the two individuals 
is foregone earnings (OADF in Figure 1). Figure 1 demonstrates 
this relationship between the expenditure-earnings streams 
diagramatically. 
FIGURE 1: Exrenditure-Earnings Streams 
Earnings of a man with educational increment (BGHC) 
Earnings for-man with'base education* (OABF) 
Earnings common to both (FECI) 
Direct cost of education (ODEF) 
Let us now consider the direct costs, which may differ 
for society and the individual, ^ince the ultimate objective 
of this paper is to investigate the effect on the return to 
education of a loan programme which would finance the cost 
of education, both the individual's and societjr's costs are 
examined. In all cases high, average, and low cost schools 
are considered separately but the emphasis of the analysis 
will be on the average cost of schooling. In addition, total 
and acadomic costs are considered separately, the difference 
between the two being the cost of such items as would have to 
be purchased whether or not school is being attended—room, 
clothes, etc. — which are included in the costs of many 
schools. The' emphasis here will be on total costs. (See Table 
2 for the costs of education in Kenya.) In all cases only 
recurrent costs are being considered. 
Rate of Return 
177777777 
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Once the costs and benefits of an investment are deter-
mined, a method is needed by which to comDare the two so that 
alternative investments can be evaluated.^ The two most 
common methods are comparisons through present values and com-
putation of internal rates of" return. 15 Descriptions of these 
two -methods follow. 
In order to evaluate any investment it is necessary to 
discount its costs and benefits because of the preferences be-
tween present and future income which exist.. Present valued 
can distinguish between two streams of earnings and thereby 
objectively determine which is the more valuable. However, 
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present value is extremely sensitive to the rate used in dis-
counting the stream of earnings. When comparing the present 
value of two earnings streams, their relative size can easily 
"be reversed by using a different rate, 17 This can happen if 
TABLE 2: Costs per Year of Education in Kenya 
(Kenyan £'s) 
EOHMS 5 & 6 TEACHERS COLLEGES UNIVERSITY 
Academic5' Totala Academica Total5 Academic5 Total5 
pb gC pb QC 
High 250 299 150 256 189 500 872 1050 
Average 90.' 152 119 196 156 260 872 1050 
Low 69 99 81 186 118 250 872 1050' 
This is defined in the text above. 
b . . . Teachers College for primary school teachers. 
c Teachers College for secondary school teachers. 
. Sources.: Ministry of Education and University College Nairobi. — ^ — 
the earnings streams cross at least once. When dealing with 
long-lived investments such as railraods, trees, or education, 
the discount rate used to compare one investment with another 
is therefore often crucialt 
The appropriate discount' rate is to some.degree subjec-
tively determined. That is, one individual's time preference and 
-risk assessment may be vastly different from that of another. 
Since, in addition, there is no identifiable "market" rate of 
interest to seize upon, various discount rates have been used 
more or less arbitrarily in studies of education.19 
Present values can be compared or alternatively, as in 
this study, the internal rate of return can be computed. The 
internal rate is the discount rate which equates the present 
value of the stream of costs, in this case foregone earnings and 
direct costs of education (OABP + ODEF as seen in Figure 1), 
to the present value of the stream of benefits, here the added 
earnings after education (BGHC).^0 Put another way, it makes the 
present value of the difference between the two expenditure-
earnings streams/' (ODEP + PGHI) - 0ACI_7 equal zero. 
Private Internal Rates of Return 
Table 3 presents a summary of the internal rates of 
return currently being earned by the. hypothetical people with 
the indicated educational increments who earn the assumed life-
time earnings. The Table is read by looking at the y.olumn 
heading, which is the base amount of education, then"down the 
column to the figure in the row of the increment in education 
the effect of which it is desired to find. Por example, to 
find the internal rate of return to an education which qualifies 
for a PI teaching post as opposed to a 4th form education, 
(called Pl-4 for short) look down the column headed by "4" to 
the row labled PI and the figure 10.6 percent is found. 
/10 
The internal rates of return in Table 3 are called 
private returns because these 'are the returns currently being 
realized by people who fit the assumptions made as to earnings 
for these levels of schooling. It should be repeated here 
that these are returns based on earnings, plus housing subsi-
dies minus income and Graduated Personal taxes, for people who 
retire at 55. Direct costs do not come into the calculation 
since all of the levels of schooling considered here are-free. 
Nevertheless, these are returns because there is a cost of the 
education to the individual: the earnings he foregoes while 
in.school. As can be seen, these rates are generally quite 
high—higher rates of return than most people who invest- in. 
capital expect to gain. 
TABLE 3: Private Rates of Return 
FROM: 4 4+ 6 PI SI A SIB 
To: '4+ 58 
6 neg neg 
PI 10.6 neg '•' a 
S1A_ 19.0 neg 42.0 39.0 
.SIB 19.0 neg 42.0 39.0 -
A;.;. • ' . . 18.8 10.7 • 26.0 24.4 19.0 18.8 
A+ 19.2 12.5 26.5 Lf\ • 
OJ 20.2 19.0 
neg = negative rate of return. 
a = Infinite rate of return as PI income is greater 
than 6 income in every year. 
One of the most interesting sequences to note is that 
through the teaching credentials (PI, SI, and A i.e., graduate). 
This is not a .time sequence as the training requirements are 
mutually exclusive rather than cumulative. PI training from 
the point of view of a 4th form graduate has a private internal 
rate of return.of 10.6%.' That is, the private costs of achieving 
a PI certificate, which are the foregone earnings that the 4th 
form graduate could earn, yield an increment in lifetime earnings 
such that, the internal rate of return is 10.6%. SI over PI has 
a return of 39%'. This high "marginal" rate brings the "average" 
rate for SI education (SI over 4j up to 19%. Nineteen percent, 
then., is the weighted average of' the PI over' 4 and the SI over 
PI rates. The education necessary for becoming a graduate 
teacher (A over Si) has an internal rate of 18.8%. This is also 
the "average" rate for a graduate teacher's investment (A over 
4). 
Th-es.e figures suggest that from the point of view of a 
4th form graduate, SI and graduate credentials are equally attrac-
tive (.19 and 18.8%, respectively) but a PI credential Is much 
less attractive (10.6%). 
The sensitivity of these results to the year or retire-
ment is 'not great. Per example, using a retirement age of 58 
rather than 55 increases the private internal rate of'return 
for PI level education over 4th form from 10.6 to 10.8 percent. 
Similarly, the rate-.-for university (A) over 4th form increases 
from 18.8'to 18.9 percent. "These are typical examples' and show 
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that the- assumption of retirement at age 55 does have an effect 
on the internal rate of return, but that it is limited to a 
few tenths of one percentage point. 
Internal Rates of Return_ under rious Programs Whereby Students 
Assume the Cost of Education""' 
These then are the current internal rates of return. vJe 
now turn to the costs of these increments in education. Table 
4 shows the return which would have been realized if the entire 
recurrent costs of the education had been met, at the time, by 
the individual receiving the education. This table is for 
average cost education. The rates of return are cut drastically 
from those seen in Table 3. However, they £re still well above 
those earned, for example, on Kenya Government bonds. This 
table alone, I think, indicates that a loan programme is indeed 
feasible. As is seen, SI teachers compared to PI teachers or 
Higher School Certificate holders.who enter the government 
service with no other qualification or training, have the highest 
rate of return to their investmentc This is a consequence of the small amount of additional expenditure necessary to move from the 
one to the other, 
TABLE 4: Returns.When Average Total Costs Are Paid as Incurred 
PROM: 4 4+ 6 PI S1A SIB 
To: 4+ 58 
6 neg a 
PI 8,4 a' 49oO 
S1A 14-7 a • 29-0 27 o8 
SIB 1 2 c 9 a ' 2 0 . 6 17.8 
A • 10,6 a 12«2 '11.3 7.6 8.5 
A+ 10c7 a 12c4 12.4 8.8 9.6 
neg = negative rate of returnc 
a = no. cost figures available „ 
If costs other than the average total cost were used in 
this exercise, different results would be found. The internal 
rates of return have also been calculated for high and low cost 
schools and for academic costs. The effects of changing these 
assumptions about cost are shown in Table 5 for two typical 
increments in education. When the entire cost is met currently, 
the effect of high versus low cost schools on the internal rate 
of return.can.be as much as "9-0 percentage points, (looking 
TABLE 5: Two Examples of the Effect of Various Cost Assumptions 
on the Internal Rates of Return 
P-4 A-4 
Total Academic Total Academic 
to 55 to 58 . to 55 to 58 to 55 to 58- to 55 to 58 
Co st; Low 9 AveragpS High 8 
.0 .9 
.4 8 
.3 8 
.2 
.6 
.5 
9 ob 
8.9 
8.6 
9«7 
9.1 
8.8 
1U.to 11.U 
. 10.5 10.7 
9.9 10.0 
11.7 
11.5 
10.8 
11 
11 
11 
.8 
.8 
.1 
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( at -all of the data ? not just tlie two examples of Table 5). The difference between charging the total cost and only the 
academic cost can be as much as 4.0 or as little as 0 percentage 
points. . When all of these possibilities are considered together 
using., these varied assumptions, there can be as much as 9.6 
percentage points var iance in the calculated rate of return. 
No rate is affected so much as to change the "tone" of the result. 
These -variations demonstrate, however, that the results of this 
analysis should be used with caution and that orders of magni-
tude are more reliable than exact figures. 
The conditions of a loan programme of any sort would not 
be nearly as stringent as those used in calculating the returns 
presented in Table 4. When the costs are paid over a period of 
years as opposed to immediately, the population which can take 
advantage of higher education is changed from an extremely 
limited one to all those with the necessary ability. There, the 
full cost of the education was paid as it was being realized. 
Any loan programme would require re-payment only after the 
education began to bear monetary fruit. Two sorts of repayment 
plans are considered here.21 In neither is an interest charged 
on the loan. The effect of an interest charge will be calculated 
in the near future. In the first a payment of a specific amount 
each month would be made until the balance of the loan had been 
repaid. In the second program,a percentage of income would be 
paid annually for life. 
For the program of repayment in which a specified sum 
was paid each month beginning one year after completion of the 
course of study, the figures of £10 per month for a university 
graduate and £2/10 per month for all lower levels were somewhat 
arbitrarily chosen. These rates do have the virtue of paying 
off the loan in a maximum of 28 years«,22 Table 6, which 
presents the rates of return under this repayment program shows 
a high return for almost all levels, usually between 15 and 30 
percent. In all cases the rates here are well above those 
shown in.Table 4. This is a result of no interest being 
included in these calculations for the loan program. Since 
the payment is over a long period of time Instead of immediately 
as in "the calculations for Table 4, the internal rate is much 
higher. From a prely economic point of view, these figures 
also suggest that a repayment program is feasible. Most levels 
of education would still have a return much higher than could 
be derived from investment In physical capital or securities. 
The second repayment program is of the type which has 7 recently been much publicized and discussed in the United States. 
It has been suggested that the charge on lifetime earnings be 
1 percent per each $3000 (£1072) borrowed. I suggest a repay-
ment of 1 percent of lifetime income per £700 borrowed for Kenya 
because the returns to education are higher here and the smaller 
amount (1% per £1072) would not even pay back the cost whereas 
1% per £700 will. In an extensive study I found returns to 
university over secondary school education in the United States 
were 9 p e r c e n t , 2 4 a s opposed to the private returns in Kenya of about 25 percent, as seen above, This program has the 
virtue of not affecting adversely the person who is unemployed 
or desires to go into a low paying, but quite worthwhile occupa-
tion since such a person pays back one percent of his income 
per £700 borrowed just as does the corporation president or 
permanent secretary who earns a much higher salary. It is just 
a smaller amount. The effect; is for the latter to subsidize 
the former. But since the repayment is. a fixed, and low, 
percentage of income, it does not impose many hardships on the 
individual. This plan has the further advantage of'being a 
sort of surcharge on the income tax which automatically comes 
due and could even be included in PAYE (pay- as you- earn). 
• o • • y / ^ 
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From an educational point of view, there is little 
doubt that a loan program would have beneficial results. 
Students who are committing a proportion of their future 
earnings in order to attend school will certainly be more 
serious about their studies than students who are "getting 
a free ride11 at the expense of Government. They will not 
only benefit in their academic studies but also in their 
attitudes towards the world and work.25 
TABLE 6: Returns 'When Average Total Costs Are Hep aid by 
Regular Monthly Par/ments of £10 for University 
or £2/10 for Others 
PROM: 4 '4+ 6 PI SI A SIB 
To 4+ a 
6 neg a 
PI 9.6 a 49.0 
S1A 17.8 a 41.8 26.4 SIB 17.8 a 41.8 26.5 — A 17.6 a 24.6 23.2 15.8 16.0 
A+ 17.8 a 25.5 23.7 16.8 16.9 
neg = negative rate of return . 
a = 'no cost-figure available 
TABLE 7: Returns When Average Total Costs Are Repaid on the 
Basis of 1% of Earnings for Life per £700. 
PROM:" 4 4+ 6 PI S1A SIB 
4+ a 
6 neg a 
PI 10.4 a 49.0 
SI A 18.6 a 39.5 26.2 SIB 18.4 a 39.0 25.6 - -
A 18.0 a 24.8 22.8' ' 17.1 17.2 
A+ 18.9 a 25.2 23.5 17.9 18.0 
neg.= negative rate of return . 
a = no cost figure available . 
What remains at question is the political and social 
feasibility of such a program. Many have suggested that loans 
for education are* impossible to collect in a» less developed 
country like Kenya. It is argued that the pressures of the 
extended family on the successful individual are so great 
that there is never any excess which could be used to retire 
educational loans. While -it -is-'quite clear: that this type of-, 
pressure does exist and is indeed heavy for many individuals, 
it is also clear that methods could be devised which would 
assist the individual in successfully resisting such pressures. 
The successful loans-for the- hire-purchase of automobiles is one 
example of the old"maxim "where there is a will, there is a 
way." ..The. fact that few salaried people are continually in 
arrears on their income and graduated personal taxes is another 
indication of this Same thing. What I am suggesting is that 
if the•right program is instituted with sufficient incentives 
/10 
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and sanctions repayment will not be politically or socially 
impracticable. A loan program's economic feasibility has already 
been demonstrated. 
The Government of Kenya already has a loan program which 
has made some 294 loans in its 15 years of existence.Ninety-
six, or 33 percent, have been repaid while only five (2%) have 
been written off as losses.. Nevertheless, this program has not 
been considered a success by most Government officials. The 
program has been small and repayments have been slow, I 7;ould 
suggest that there is a causal relationship here. There is a 
great feeling that the program is unfair because only a small 
minority of all those receiving higher education have to pay 
for it. It would appear that a. program encompassing all 
students would have a much better chance of success in collecting 
the money due and receiving popular support. 
Government's Internal Rates of Return 
Some have suggested that the increased tax revenue 
associated with the increased income of those with higher 
education adequately compensates. Government for the cost of 
that education. Table 8 presents the internal rate of return 
realized by Government on educational investment expenditure. 
The "return" to Government is the increment in tax revenue 
associated with the higher earnings of the more educated •• 
individuals. The calculation, then, is a comparison of total 
expenditure on education 'to taxes received* This implicitly 
assumes that the jobs for which the specified education 
"qualifies" individuals would not be filled if there-were ho "'•-' 
Government supported education. To the extent that such jobs 
are filled 'by expatriates, undereduoated people, or privately 
educated people, the internal rate of return to. government is 
infinite, as these have no cost to government. As can be seen, 
the majority of the figures are very small. I would argue 
that even if the return to Government was quite high in every 
case, this would be no justification for the free education 
which is now current. The tax structure is aimed at having 
each person shoulder a portion, based on his income, of the : expense of Government. This is quite separate from the issue 
of free education. 
TABLE 8: Internal Rates of-Return to Government 
PROM: Zt 6 P S1A SIB 
To: 6 neg 
' P neg 15. .0 S1A 7.0 16, .0 16., 7 SIB 3»8 8. .4 8» 2 
A 1.4 1, .9 1. 8 neg(-O.l) neg(-0.5) 
A+ 3.5 4, .0 4. 0 3.2 3.2 
neg = negative rate of return. 
TABLE 9: Lifetime Ta^si: Income and Graduated Personal 
(Kenyan £'s} 
4 4+ 6 PI S1A,B A A+ 
To age 55a 1,308 4,218 993. 1,445 2,906 5,527 8,839 
To age 5813 1,398 5,372 ^083 1,577 3,191 6,081 10,943 
-•Government's suggested retirement age, 
• • • Forty years after form 4, 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that loan 
programs for higher levels of education would not "be a heavy • 
economic 'burden on students. The loan program which requires 
the repayment of a percentage of income for life is one which 
should be politically feasible as well. The "welfare implica-
tion of the present situation versus the situation which would 
exist in a "loan program world" are obvious. In this connec-
tion it might be useful to point out that the resources support 
ing one university student for one year could support 130 
primary school students for that period.27 
Alternatively, the resources could be used for general 
Government development purpose-s. In either case, a redistribu 
tion from the most, to the least, affluent would result. 
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1. Kenya African National Union, :#iat a KANU Government Offers 
You, (KANU, Nairobi 1963), "K.A.N.U. intends tiiat every 
child in Kenya shall have a minimum of seven years' free 
education.", p.4. 
2. This is true for all except some 40% of the Form 5 and 6 
stiidents. These are students at the former Asian and 
European schools, many of whom are not citizens. The 
Kenyan school system consists of the following: 
primary school - standards 1-7 - capped by the Kenya Primary 
Examinat ion: s e condary school - forms 1-4 - capped by the 
Cambridge School Certificate and forms.5 and 6 capped by 
the Higher School Certificate; teachers training colleges, 
technical and speciality schools; and a three year University 
course capped by the bachelors degree. 
3. "A third major obstacle to be overcome before the goal of 
universal primary education can be reached is the substantial 
capital and recurrent cost which expansion of the physical 
facilities and teaching staff imply." p.306, Kenya Government. 
Development Han 1966-1970,(Government Printer, Nairobi '1966). 
Appj^mEgly one third, some £3.2 million, of the cost of 
primary education is met by school fees, see Kyale Mwendwa, 
"Constraint and Strategy in Planning Education" in James R. 
Sheffield, ed., Education and Rural Development, (East African 
Publishing House, Nairobi, 1967), p. 273 
4. "...the highest priority in education is the rapid expansion 
and diversification of secondare;" schools. To this end fees 
for Forms V and VI in low-cost schools have been eliminated... 
This will provide a growing base for increasing the supply 
of middle- and high-level manpower." (Emphasis added.) p.£07, 
Development Plan 1966-1970. On the other hand, there is an 
as yet unfullfilled declaration that in the future Government 
will "continue to ...move increasingly towards loans as a 
method of financing the studies of students in post-secondary 
school education." p. 311? Ibid. 
5. The United States will have data approaching this ideal in 
some 40 37-ears time. A lifetime study of some 460,000 
secondary school students is being undertaken under near 
perfect conditions. See John C. Planagan, et al., Project 
Talent: The American High-School Student, (Pittsburgh: 
Project Talent Office, University of Pittsburgh, 1964). 
6. Education of Form 4 or more is the criterion for high and 
middle level manpower which Davis used in his projections 
for Kenya's manpower plan. Calvin F. Davis, High-Level 
Manpower Requirements and Resources in Kenya 1964-1970» 
(Government Press: Nairobi, 1965), p.5. 
7. See Republic of Kenya, Staff List as of 1st July, 1966 (Nairobi 
1966) pp. vi-viii, for a full listing of the scales used in 
these calculations. These scales have since been marginally 
changed. 
8. See e.g. Dharam Ghai, Analytical Aspect -of an Incomes Policy 
for Kenya, (IDS Discussion Paper Imo. 50; p. 17. An additional 
factor is that Employment in the public sector was growing 
faster than the private, (3.1 versus'2.4%), see Kenya 
Government, Economic Survey 1967. 
9. This is a civil service scale of salaries and time progression 
through them. See fn. 7. 
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10, A PI teacher must have one year of teacher training plus- a 
Cambridge School Certificate (Form 4 graduation) and teaches 
primary school, SI is'a secondary school: teachers' 
credential . It may be obtained by two routes: Both must 
have Cambridge School Certificate. In addition what I called 
an "S1A" has three years of teacher training college while 
an "SIB" has a Higher School Certificate (through Form 6) 
plus one year of 'teacher training college. 
11. 4th form enter in year' 
in year 3; PI teachers 
teachers enter in year 
1; 4+ enter in year 2: 6th form enter 
enter in year 3; Sl(A) and Sl(B) 
4; and A and A+ enter in year 6. 
12. The subsidy is the maximum specified for each salary as 
presented In the Salaries Review Commission. Taxes are 
calculated on the basis of average age of marriage (24) 
(14 years) and childbearing, (First child at age 25; 
second at age 29; third at age 3^; and fourth at age 39. 
Only four children are relevant for income tax purposes.) 
These were derived from Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, Kenya Population Census: 1962 (Nairobi 1964). 
13* If one year increments of education were being compared, 
this would fully account for the foregone earnings. However, 
if educational increments of more than one year are being 
considered (e.g., two years of college vs. secondary school 
graduation) it is a moot question as to whether the earnings 
differential between the two people being compared fully 
• represents the earnings foregone. One of the two possibili-
ties to be reconciled is that at the end of first year the 
additional year of education might mean that the more-
educated man would have a higher marginal product than the 
less educated individual, so that the latter's earnings in 
the second year are not as great as the former's earnings 
potential. On the other hand, the less educated man has 
one year of experience which adds to his value in the 
second year over that of a man who is first entering the 
?\rork force. The difference in value between a year of 
schooling and a year or working experience is difficult to 
estimate expirically. 'The problem becomes rather more 
complex when people with larger differences in education 
are being compared. 
14. The following discussion draws heavily on my Private Rates 
of Return to Education in the United' States,:' a Case Sfcudy 
(unpublished Ph.D dissertatica, Yale, 1967), chapter 1. 
investments, - s« 15. For extensive discussions of these two methods of comparing ;e Ezra- Solomon, ed., The Management of 
apital (Free Press: Few York, 1959); especially 
chapters by Armen A. Alchian. "The Rate of Interest, 
Corporate 
the 
' 5 Cat 
Fisher's Rate of Return over Costs and Keynes' Internal 
Rate of Return," and J. Hirshleifer, "On the Theory of 
Optimal Investment Decision", 
16. n 
PV ='- Ei 
i-Od+r)1 
Where: PV= present value; 
R= return in a given 
period; 
r= the discount rate 
per period; and 
i= the period. 
17. For example, at 20 percent, $100.. today and $500 ten years 
from now (A) is -better than SO today and $1,000 in ten 
years (B) (A's present value = $180 and B's = $162), but 
at 10 percent the opposite is true (A's present value = 
$293 and B's = $386). 
Present Value 
At 20 percent At 10 percent 
$180 $293 
Investment 
A 
B 
Payments 
Today In 10 Years 
$100 
0 
$500 
$1,000 $162 $386 
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18. See Hirshleifer, pp. 223-25 of Solomon. 
19. Sates of 0, 3, 3 1/2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 percent have all 
been used by other researchers. 
20. The present values of the returns at each discount rate 
are plotted on a graph of present value versus discount 
rate. The same is done for the costs, 
fitted to each of these sets of points, 
the two lines cross yields the.value of 
of return (Figure 2 A). Alternatively, 
of the net returns can be plotted 
to them. In this case, the point 
the discount rate axis is the value of the 
of return (Figure 2 B). 
A curve is then 
The point where 
the internal rate 
the present values 
and have a curve fitted 
where the line crosses 
nternal rate 
PV A FIGURE 2 PV 
RETURNS 
COSTS 
NET RETURNS 
(RETURNS-COSTS) 
0 4 r*8 4 8 
Where: PV = Present Value; r= Discount rate; r* = Internal 
rate of 
return. 
21. I do plan to consider others when time permits. 
22. University—28 years; S1A—17 years; SIB—26 years; PI—10 
years; 6th Form—9 years. 
23. See for example, Time Magazine's over story .on "The Pre-
carious Future of the Private College, June 23, 1967, Vol. 
89, No. 25• See also Educational Opportunity Bank: a 
Report of the Panel on Educational~Innovation (U.S. Govern-
ment Printer, Washington, D.C., 1967-) • 
24-. See my Private Rates of Returns to Education in the United 
States., op.' cit., Chapter 6 for an extensive comparison of 
•the rates of return in tire. United States found by several 
researchers. 
25* See Educational Opportunity Bank, op. cit.,. p. 7? for a 
similar 'viewpoint. 
26. According to the Ministry of Education. These loans 
averaged £532. The terms of .the loans are as follows: 
they must be repaid within'8 years; the interest is paid 
on the loan at the rate of 4percent per annum; a declara-
tion of financial inability must be submitted; the student 
must already be admitted to an institution of higher 
education; security in the form of collateral or "personal 
bonds signed by substantial citizens" must be posted; and 
the person is expected to return and take up employment. 
GN 360 of 1962, Government of Kenya, The Kenya Gazette Vol. 
LXIV (Government Printer, Nairobi 1962) and colony of Kenya 
Ordinances Enacted Purine; the year 1952 Vol XXXI (new 
series), COovernment Printer: Nairobi, 1953) p. 373-
27* Mwendwa, op. cit., states that the cost of primary education 
is about £8 per student per year.. The costs of higher levels 
of education to the Government over the next decade and the 
effect on Government revenue- of a loan program will be 
investigated in a forthcoming paper. 
